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1. Introduction
The (non-)equivalence of cost effectiveness analysis and cost benefit analysis has
received much attention in the literature on the economic evaluation of health care
(Phelps and Mushlin, 1991; Johannesson, 1995; Donaldson 1998). This attention
emanates from a concern about the theoretical properties of cost effectiveness analysis.
Notwithstanding the fact that it is currently the most common tool in the economic
evaluation of health care, cost effectiveness analysis, unlike cost benefit analysis, has no
foundation in economic welfare theory.  
The most widely used outcome measure in cost effectiveness analysis are quality-
adjusted life-years (QALYs). There is a well-established literature describing the conditions
under which QALY based decision making is consistent with preferences over lifetime
health profiles (Pliskin et al., 1980; Bleichrodt, 1995; Bleichrodt et al., 1997; Bleichrodt
and Quiggin, 1997; Miyamoto et al., 1998). Much less is known about the consistency
between QALY based decision making1 and individual preferences when lifetime utility
depends not only on health status, but also on consumption. In this paper we derive a set
of conditions that is both necessary and sufficient for the consistency of QALY based
decision making with life-cycle preferences over consumption and health status. Cost
benefit analysis is always consistent with life-cycle preferences over consumption and
health status. This follows because cost benefit analysis imposes no assumptions on the
lifetime utility function over consumption and health status. Consequently, to show under
which conditions cost effectiveness analysis is consistent with life cycle preferences over
consumption and health also answers the question under which conditions cost
effectiveness analysis is consistent with cost benefit analysis.
Two recent papers by Garber and Phelps (1997) and Meltzer (1997) also analyzed
the allocation of health resources within a life cycle framework, where both health status
and consumption are arguments of the utility function. These papers focus on the
question when the cost side of cost effectiveness analysis is consistent with life-cycle
                                                
1 Throughout the text we interchangeably use the terms cost effectiveness analysis and QALY based
decision making. Our central result, derived in Section Two, carries over to other outcome measures as
preferences over consumption and health status. Their main concern is whether future
consumption should be regarded as a cost of life-saving medical interventions. Although
Garber and Phelps assume that the health argument of the utility function may be
represented in terms of QALYs, neither they nor Meltzer consider the conditions under
which an individual concerned about both health status and general consumption would
seek to maximise QALYs. This paper complements the papers by Garber and Phelps and
by Meltzer by focusing on the question when the outcome side of cost effectiveness
analysis, i.e., QALY maximisation, is consistent with life cycle preferences. Throughout
the paper, we assume that costs are measured in a consistent way and we restrict attention
to the valuation of outcomes.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we derive the central result of this
paper, that QALY maximisation is consistent with life cycle preferences only if the
utility function over consumption and health status can be decomposed multiplicatively
and the utility of consumption is constant. Section 3 provides an axiomatic analysis of
the conditions under which the utility function over consumption and health status is
multiplicative. The axiomatic analysis of the multiplicative model is given both under
expected utility theory and under rank dependent utility theory, currently the most
important nonexpected utility model. Even though this section is technical, we have tried
to increase its accessibility by putting all technical assumptions and proofs in an appendix
and by making ample use of examples to illustrate the conditions that are introduced. In
Section 4 we derive constancy of consumption. We show that if the utility function over
consumption and health status is multiplicative then consumption is constant if an
individual’s rate of time preference equals the interest rate. Section 4 further examines the
implications of the multiplicative model for the valuation of longevity and the willingness
to pay for a QALY gained. Johannesson (1995) has argued that cost effectiveness can
only be a useful tool if information is available on the willingness to pay for a QALY
gained. To date, such information is not available. We derive expressions for the
willingness to pay for a QALY gained in several decision contexts and identify the
principal factors that determine it. Section 5 concludes.
2. The central result
Our aim is to show under what conditions QALY based decision making is
consistent with life-cycle preferences over consumption and health status. The general
idea of our argument follows from the uniqueness properties of the additive utility
function and a special property of health. Let (h1, ,hT) denote a sequence of health
states, where ht stands for the health state in time period t. Similarly ((c1, h1), .,(cT, hT))
denotes a sequence of consumption levels and health states, where (ct, ht) denotes the
consumption level and the health state in period t.
The first step in our derivation is to realize that according to the QALY model
the utility of the sequence (h1, ,hT) is equal to q ht
t
T
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, where q(ht) is the quality weight
or utility of the health state in period t. Two things should be noted about the QALY
utility function. First, it is additive and second, the one-period utility functions are
identical. It is well known from the literature on additive representations (e.g. Wakker,
1989) that if the one-period utility functions are additive then they are unique up t o
positive linear transformations. That is, if q(ht) and q′(ht) are both additive one-period
utility funcions then
q(ht) = α + βq′(ht)  (1)
where α can be any real number and β is a strictly positive real number. Note that because
the q(ht) are unique up to positive linear transformations, we are free to choose their scale
and location. Throughout, we set the utility of death equal to zero.
Suppose now, that an individual is not only concerned about the sequence of
health states, but also cares about consumption. That is, we now study preferences over
the sequence ((c1, h1), .,(cT, hT)). We assume that an individual always prefers more
consumption to less as long as health status is better than death. By consequence, utility is
strictly increasing in consumption. If the utility function over ((c1, h1), .,(cT, hT)) is
consistent with the QALY utility function then we know by the argument of the
preceding paragraph that it must be a positive linear transformation thereof. Hence, it
must have the following form:
U[(c1, h1),..,(cT, hT)] = [ ( ) ( ) ( )]v c q h w ct t
t
T
+
=1
(2)
where v is a utility function over consumption that must be strictly positive (v(c)
corresponds to β  in Eq.(1)) and the wt are period-specific utility functions over
consumptions that are real-valued (the wt correspond to α in Eq.(1)).
We next employ a special characteristic of the life cycle model for consumption
and health, namely the fact that an individual will derive no more utility from
consumption once he has died. Bequest motives may lead individuals to consume amounts
less than their full wealth. However, it is reasonable to suppose, as is commonly done in
economic analyses of bequest motives, that any utility of bequests is additively separable
from U[(c1, h1),.., (cT, hT)]. Therefore, the existence and form of the utility of bequests
has no implications for the form of U[(c1, h1),..,(cT, hT)]. Because q(death) is equal t o
zero, it follows from Eq. (2) that the wt(c) must be equal to zero to capture the fact that
the individual derives no more utility from consumption after he has died. It follows that
life cycle preferences over consumption and health status are consistent with QALY
maximization only if :
U[(c1, h1),..,(cT, hT)]= v c q htt
T
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(3)
Equation (3) has three interesting properties. First, the utility of consumption is
constant over the individual s life cycle from which it follows as a consequence of the
assumption that utility is strictly increasing in consumption that consumption itself is
constant over the individual s life cycle. Second, the utility of consumption is positive. If
there exists a subsistence level of consumption beyond which additional life-years are
negatively valued, then consumption has to be above this subsistence level. This is not a
major restriction. Rosen (1988) has shown that if consumption falls below the subsistence
level an individual will convexify his preferences by randomizing between death and
survival at a consumption level which is higher than the subsistence level. Hence, Eq.(3)
captures all cases of economic interest. Third, in Eq.(3) the utility of health status is
multiplied by the utility of consumption. By consequence, a given gain in quality of life
will be more appreciated at higher levels of consumption. This implies that in the
allocation of health care resources, larger gains in QALYs can be obtained by devoting
resources to those individuals who have a high level of general consumption. A
comparable result was derived by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) for the valuation of risk
reductions.
In the next section we present an axiomatic analysis of the mutliplicative model
U[(c1, h1)..,(cT, hT)] =  v c q ht t
t
T
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. This model is slightly more general than Eq.(3)
because consumption is allowed to vary over time. If consumption varies over the life
cycle, an optimal allocation of health resources will assign more weight to health status in
high consumption years. Conversely, other things equal, an individual with multiplicative
preferences will choose higher levels of consumption in those years in which his health
status is high. The selection of a constant consumption level has to follow from an
optimization problem which requires specification of the budget constraint. We present
such an optimization problem in Section 4.
3. Characterization of the multiplicative model
We focus on preferences under risk. Preferences under certainty follow by
restricting attention to degenerate lotteries: lotteries giving one outcome with probability
one. Life-cycle preferences are first analyzed under expected utility theory, the only
theory considered thus far in the literature on the valuation of life. However, it is by now
widely accepted that people do not behave according to expected utility theory (Camerer,
1995). Several nonexpected utility theories have been developed among which rank
dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987; Quiggin and Wakker, 1994) is
currently the most influential theory. We therefore also derive the multiplicative model
under rank-dependent utility theory.
We start with the case where utility is not discounted. The treatment of
discounting is similar in expected utility and in rank dependent utility and we therefore
leave it to the end. We characterize two discounting models: constant rate discounting and
a general discounting model which is consistent with the most important alternatives for
constant rate discounted utility that have been proposed to date in the literature on
intertemporal preferences.
3.1. Expected Utility Theory
3.1.1. Some notation
In this subsection we introduce the main concepts used in our axiomatic analysis.
To improve accessibility, we have stated the technical assumptions regarding these
concepts in the appendix.
We assume that there are T points in time. We express this by saying that there is
a set S = {1, ,T} of time points. The set of all outcomes, i.e. sequences
[(c1,h1),..,(cT,hT)], is denoted by X. For ease of notation, we sometimes refer to pairs (ct,
ht) as yt. The consumption levels ct in each period are elements of a set C
+, which consists
of all attainable consumption levels. The plus sign serves as a reminder that we only
consider consumption levels that are above the subsistence level. The health states ht are
elements of a set H, which consists of all attainable health states. We assume that H
consists only of those health states that are at least as good as death. For expected utility
this assumption can easily be relaxed. In fact our axiomatic analysis also holds if negative
he lth st tes he lth st tes worse th n de th re included For r nk dependent utility
however, the generalization to negative health states is more arduous. We assume that the
sets C+ and H are equal in each time period. This assumption is made for convenience. I t
does not restrict our analysis; it is straightforward to extend the analysis to cases where C+
and H vary over time.
3.1.2. Preference conditions and representation theorem
Let P be the set of all lotteries over X. A typical element of P is [p1, x
(1); ; pm,
x(m)] which gives outcome x(1) = ( , ), .. .. ,( , )c h c hT T1
1
1
1 1 1
with probability p1, outcome x
(2) =
( , ), .. .. ,( , )c h c hT T1
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 with probability p2, etc. and m is any natural number. In medical
decision making, lotteries can be interpreted as treatments, the outcomes of which are
risky. We assume that the set P contains all degenerate lotteries: lotteries of the type [1,
x], that give outcome x with probability one, i.e., with certainty.
An individual is assumed to have preferences over P. We denote the individual s
preference relation over P by , which stands for at least as preferred as.  We write x
 y if it is true that x  y but not y  x. That is, x  y means that x is strictly
preferred to y. We write x ∼ y if both x  y and y  x are true. That is, x ∼ y means
that x is indifferent to y.
Even though  is defined over lotteries over outcomes, we can derive a
preference relation over outcomes from it by restricting attention to degenerate lotteries.
We assume that the preference relation over outcomes satisfies monotonicity with respect
to consumption: higher consumption levels are strictly preferred to lower levels. We also
assume a sort of monotonicity with respect to health status: if health state h1 is preferred
to health state h2 for a given level of consumption, then h1 is preferred to h2 for all levels
of consumption.
A function V is said to represent the preference relation , if for any two
lotteries P1 and P2 that belong to the set P it is true that the individual considers P1 at
least as preferred as P2 if and only if the value of V at P1 is at least as great as the value of
V at P2. We express this condition mathematically as: P1  P2 if and only if V(P1) ≥
V(P2).
We assume that the expected utility axioms (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1953; Jensen, 1967) hold. Then the preference relation  is represented by the following
function:
EU[p1, x
(1);..; pm, x
(m)] = ( )
=
m
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where U is a utility function over outcomes. The function U in Eq.(4) is still entirely
general. Our aim is to give a set of conditions that ensure the utility function U[(c1,
h1),..,(cT, hT)] =  v c q ht t
t
T
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is representing. We arrive at this final result by imposing
four conditions.
The first condition, marginality, ensures that U is a weighted additive function
U[(c1, h1),..,(cT, hT)] = 
=
T
t
ttt hcU
1
),( of one period utility functions Ut.
Definition 1: The preference relation over P satisfies marginality if for all P1, P2∈P
with
equal marginal probability distributions over y1,..,yT : P1 ∼ P2.
2
As an example of marginality, consider a simple model in which there are only
two time periods. Let y′ be the outcome (20,000, good health), i.e., a consumption level
of 20,000 Euro and good health, and let y′′ be the outcome (5,000, bad health). Let P1 be
a lottery that yields y′ in both periods with probability _ and y′′ in both periods also with
                                                
2 Marginality can be weakened. For example, we can only impose it for gambles with two outcomes
both with probability 0.5. We used this version of marginality because we believe it is the most
a probability of _, i.e. P1 = [_, (y′, y′); _, (y′′, y′′)]. P2 is a lottery that yields a sequence
(y′, y′′), i.e., y′ in the first period and y′′ in the second period, with probability _ and a
sequence (y′′, y′) with probability _. By marginality the individual should be indifferent
between P1 and P2. This follows because in both lotteries there is in each time period a
probability of _ that the individual obtains y′ and a probability of _ that the individual
obtains y′′. This example illustrates the working of marginality. Marginality excludes all
complementarity between time periods. It might well be that the individual prefers P1 t o
P2 because he dislikes variation in his consumption and health status levels. Such an
aversion to variation is not permitted under marginality.
The next step in our derivation is to make the one-period utility functions
identical and to exclude the differential weighting of time periods. That is, we have t o
impose a condition which makes it possible to represent by preferences by the utility
function U(c1, h1..,cT, hT) = U c ht t
t
T
( , )
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. Before we introduce the condition that achieves
this end, symmetry, we have to define a new concept. A permutation function π(t) is a
function that specifies a rearrangement of the time periods. For example if π(t)=s then
the point t is moved to point s in the rearrangement of the time periods.
Definition 2:  The preference relation over P satisfies symmetry if for all x∈X
and for all
permutation functions π it is true that (x1,..,xT) ∼ (xπ(1),.., xπ(T)).
Let y′ and y′′ be as in the previous example. Then by symmetry the individual is
indifferent between the outcome x′ which yields y′ in the first period and y′′ in the second
period and the outcome x′′ which yields y′′ in the first period and y′ in the second. This
follows because x′′ can be obtained from x′ by applying the permutation π(1) = 2 and π(2)
= 1.
If symmetry holds, the individual s preferences are unaffected if we turn a
decreasing sequence, i.e., a sequence of which the outcomes become worse over time, into
an  increasing sequence, a sequence of which outcomes improve over time, by a
permutation of the time periods. That is, symmetry renders the point in time at which a
particular outcome occurs irrelevant. Symmetry is at odds with the assumption that
people have positive time preference made in most economic evaluations. Later in this
section we show how symmetry can be replaced by conditions that ensure positive
discounting.
Marginality and symmetry ensure that the utility function over sequences of
consumption and health status is additively decomposable over time and that the utility
function is equal for each time period. We now have to establish that the one-period
utility function can be multiplicatively decomposed, i.e., U(ct, ht) = v(ct)q(ht). The next
condition we introduce, standard gamble invariance, ensures that U(ct, ht) can be written as
v(ct)q(ht) + wt(ct). The final condition, the zero condition, then allows us to set wt(ct) = 0
for all t and for all consumption levels.
Definition 3: The preference relation over P satisfies standard gamble invariance if for
all c,c′∈C+:
(c,h)  [p, (c,h′); 1−p, (c,h′′)] if and only if (c′,h)  [p, (c′,h′); 1−p,
(c′,h′′)]
with all lotteries elements of P.
To illustrate, let h, h′, and h′′ be three health ststes such that h′ is better than h
which is better than h′′. For example, h can be no asthma, h′ a mild form of asthma, and
h′′ a severe form of asthma. Suppose that annual consumption is held fixed at a given
level, say 20,000 Euro, and that at this consumption level the individual considers being
in health state h for certain at least as good as undergoing a risky treatment which yields
h′ with probability p and h′′ with probability 1−p. Then standard gamble invariance says
that the individual should still consider being in health state h for certain at least as good
as undergoing the risky treatment if consumption is held fixed at another level, say 5,000
Euro. This example illustrates the effect of standard gamble invariance. Standard gamble
invariance enables consideration of preferences over health states irrespective of the level
at which consumption is held fixed.
Standard gamble invariance is typically invoked in health utility measurement. In
assessing the utility of a health state by the standard gamble, it is commonly assumed that
life-years can be held fixed and that the value at which life-years are held fixed does not
affect preferences. This idea is similar to standard gamble invariance as we use it here.
The only difference is that we hold consumption instead of life-years fixed in the
assessment of preferences over health states.
Because standard gamble invariance allows separate consideration of preferences
over health status, it also allows the definition of a separate utility function over health
status which does not depend on consumption. In the appendix we prove that imposing
standard gamble invariance on top of marginality and symmetry implies that the one-
period utility functions U(ct, ht) can be written as wt(ct) + v(ct)q(ht) with wt(ct) real and
v(ct) positive. This model differs from the multiplicative model that we seek to derive by
the terms wt(ct). To complete our characterization, we have to impose a condition that
gives wt(ct)=0 for all t and for all ct. As it turns out, the condition that ensures this, the
zero condition, is a condition that is naturally satisfied in the medical context. In words,
the zero condition says that a person derives no more utility from consumption once he
has died. Formally, the zero condition is defined as:
Definition 4:  The preference relation satisfies the zero condition if for all
consumption
levels c, c′∈C+: (c, death) ∼ (c′, death).
We summarize the derivation of the multiplicative representation in Theorem 1.
A formal proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendix.
Theorem 1: Under expected utility theory, the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) Life-cycle preferences are consistent with the maximization of
=
=
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(ii) The preference relation  satisfies marginality, symmetry,
standard gamble invariance, and the zero condition.
3.1.3.An assessment of the conditions of Theorem 1
Before moving on to the characterization of the multiplicative model in the rank
dependent utility model, let us briefly comment on the conditions described in the
previous subsection. Because the conditions are new in the context of life-cycle
preferences over consumption and health, there exists no direct empirical evidence with
respect to their descriptive validity. We believe that marginality and symmetry are the
most restrictive conditions of the characterization. The zero condition is unobjectionable
in the medical context. Further, even though standard gamble invariance has not been
tested in the context of life-cycle preferences over consumption and health status, there
is some evidence that preferences over health status and duration satisfy utility
independence which implies standard gamble invariance (Miyamoto and Eraker, 1988,
Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997). Utility independence is commonly assumed both in
medical decision analyses (Torrance et al., 1982; Torrance et al., 1995; Torrance et al.,
1996) and in general decision analysis (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) and it is believed to be a
reasonable condition in most decision contexts.
As was shown above, marginality excludes all complementarity between time
periods. This is a strong restriction. In the example presented in subsection 3.2,
marginality implies that people are indifferent with respect to variations in their
consumption level and in their health state. However, empirical evidence shows that
people have a tendency to overweight their status quo or endowment and are averse t o
changes therein (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988: Kahneman et al., 1990). Such a
tendency is incompatible with marginality. In the next subsection we show that under
rank dependent utility theory marginality need no longer be imposed and can be replaced
by an alternative condition. This may enhance the descriptive validity of the
multiplicative representation.
Finally, we have seen that symmetry excludes differential weighting of time
periods and therefore symmetry excludes positive time preference. Economic theory
posits and empirical evidence shows that people typically prefer to receive benefits
sooner rather than later, i.e., they have positive time preference. The existence of
positive time preference calls for the replacement of symmetry. In subsection 3.3., we
show how symmetry can be relaxed to allow for (positive) time preference.
3.2. Rank Dependent Utility Theory
3.2.1. Some notation
Contrary to expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory does not
assume that the utility of a lottery is linear in probability. Under rank dependent utility
theory, preferences over lotteries are represented by the functional
RDU[p1, x(1);..; pm, x(m)] = ( )
=
m
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where the πi are decision weights that depend on, but are in general not equal to the
probabilities. depend on the cumulative probability distribution. If the decision weights are
equal to the probabilities, i.e. πi = pi for all i, then rank dependent utility theory is equal t o
expected utility theory. That is, rank dependent utility theory includes expected utility
theory as a special case.
Compared with expected utility theory, there is one conceptual change.
Remember that under expected utility we studied preferences over the set of lotteries P.
Under rank-dependent utility theory, we consider preferences over a subset of the set of
lotteries P, the set of rank-ordered lotteries. A lottery [p1, x(1);..; pm, x(m)] is said to be a
rank-ordered lottery  if its outcomes are ranked in decreasing order of preference, i.e., x(1)
 x(2) ...  x(m). For example, the lottery [p, full health; 1−p, death] is rank-ordered
because full health is a better health state than death. However, the lottery [p, death; 1−p,
full health] is not rank-ordered. We denote the set of rank-ordered lotteries by P↓.
The set of rank ordered lotteries contains all degenerate probability distributions.
This follows because each outcome is at least as preferred as itself: x  x for all x∈X. By
consequence, we can once again define preferences over outcomes by restricting attention
to the degenerate probability distributions.
We also introduce one new notation. Let A be a subset {s, ,t} of the set of time
points {1,..,T} which we denoted by S. Obviously, 1 7 s 7 t 7 T. By aAx we denote the
outcome (x1,..,xs−1,as,..,at,xt+1,..,xT), i.e., we replace the elements xs,..,xt of the sequence x
= (x1, ,xT) with the respective elements as,..,at of the sequence (a1, ,aT). To give a
simple example, let T be 40, let S be {25,..,30}, let x be the constant sequence yielding a
consumption level of 20,000 Euro and good health for 40 periods and let a be the
constant sequence yielding a consumption level of 5,000 Euro and bad health for 40
periods. Then aAx is the outcome yielding a consumption level of 20,000 Euro and good
health from period 1 to period 24, a consumption level of 5,000 Euro and bad health
from period 25 to period 30, and a consumption level of 20,000 Euro and good health
from period 31 to period 40.
In case the set A consistst of just one point in time, say point t, then we write atx
instead of aAx.
3.2.2. Preference conditions and representation theorem
We use the same steps in the characterization of the multiplicative representation
v c q ht t
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 as in subsection 3.1.2. Hence, the first step is to find a condition that
allows utility to be written as the additive sum of the one-period utility functions, i.e.,
U[(c1, h1),..,(cT, hT)] = 
=
T
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),( . Under expected utility theory, marginality served
to ensure that the utility function could be written in this form. However, marginality is
no longer available under rank dependent utitlity theory, because marginality only leads t o
an additive decomposition of utility if the evaluation function for lotteries is linear in the
probabilies. As we have seen, this is not necessarily true under rank dependent utility
theory. Therefore, marginality cannot be retained and we have to find a condition which
achieves the additive decomposition under rank dependent utility theory. The following
condition, generalized utility independence, has this effect.
Definition 5: The preference relation   on P↓ satisfies generalized utility
independence if
for all subsets A of S:
[p, aAz; 1−p, bAy]  [p, cAz; 1−p, dAy] if and only if
[p, aAw; 1−p, bAv]  [p, cAw; 1−p, dAv]
with all lotteries elements of P↓.
An example may clarify the effect of generalized utility independence. For ease of
notation, we assume that health status is constant, say at full health, and we will suppress
it from our notation. Let there be two time periods and let A={1}. Let a = z = 20,000, c =
25,000, b = y = w = 15,000, and d  = v = 10,000. It can be verified that all lotteries are
rank-ordered. The first preference then says that the lottery P1 yielding the outcome
(20,000, 20,000) with probability p and the outcome (15,000, 15,000) with probability
1−p is at least as preferred as the lottery P2 yielding the outcome (30,000, 20,000) with
probability p and the outcome (10,000, 15,000) with probability 1−p. Generalized utility
independence then implies that the lottery P3 yielding the outcome (20,000, 15,000)
with probability p and the outcome (15,000, 10,000) with probability 1−p should also be
at least as preferred as the lottery P4 yielding the outcome (30,000, 15,000) with
prob bility p nd the outcome (10 000 10 000) with prob bility 1 p Note th t the
probabbility distribution over what happens in the second period is identical both for P1
and P2 (a probability of _ of 20,000 and a probability of _ of 15,000) and for P3 and P4 (a
probability of _ of 15,000 and a probability of _ of 10,000). Generalized utility
independence therefore implies that if two lotteries have identical probability distributions
over the outcomes in a given period, then the individual will ignore the outcomes
occurring in this period and he will only focus on the periods in which the two lotteries
have different probability distributions over the outcomes. Note that this excludes the
possiblity that an individual pays attention to complementarity of outcomes between the
periods. For example, generalized utility independence excludes that the individual has a
preference for variation.
In the absence of empirical evidence, we can only speculate about the descriptive
validity of generalized utility independence. Note however that the more common
condition of utility independence can be derived from the definition of generalized utility
independence by setting z = y and v = w. As remarked before, utility independence is
widely believed to be a preference condition that describes preferences reasonably well,
both in medical decisions and in other decision contexts. Generalized utility independence
is only slightly stronger than utility independence and from this it may be inferred that
generalized utility independence describes life-cycle preferences over consumption and
health reasonably well. On the other hand, if the individual dislikes variation in his
consumption level, then it may well be that he prefers P1 to P2 and P4 to P3 in the above
example.
The other three conditions used in the characterization of the multiplicative
model v c q ht t
t
T
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under expected utility theory can still be used under rank-dependent
utility theory. Theorem 2 summarizes the derivation. A formal proof of Theorem 2 is
given in the appendix.
Theorem 2: Under rank dependent utility theory the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) Life-cycle preferences are consistent with the maximization of
=
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(ii) The preference relation >;
∼
 on P↓ satisfies generalized
marginality. Further >;
∼
 satisfies  symmetry, standard gamble
invariance, and the zero-condition.
3.3 Discounting
3.3.1. The general discounting model
The characterizations presented in Theorems 1 and 2 imply that people give
equal weight to each time period, i.e., they are timing neutral. As remarked, in economic
evaluations it is more common to assume that people have positive time preference and
discount future time periods. Empirical evidence concerning intertemporal choices is also
supportive of the existence of positive time preference for health (Olsen, 1993a, Cairns,
1994, Chapman, 1996).
In this section, we characterize two models that incorporate time preference. In
one model, we impose no restrictions on the discount weights. Therefore, this model is
consistent with most discounting models that have been proposed in the literature on
intertemporal preferences (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Harvey, 1994). The other
model is the constant rate discounting model, which commonly applied in cost
effectiveness analysis and also underlies the analyses by Garber and Phelps (1997) and
Meltzer (1997).
Timing neutrality is a consequence of imposing symmetry in the characterization,
both under expected utility theory and under rank dependent utility theory. Therefore, t o
allow for time preference symmetry has to be replaced. However, symmetry also served
to select identical one-period utility functions in Theorems 1 and 2.  If symmetry is
dropped, the one-period utility functions are no longer necessarily identical. Hence, we
have to replace symmetry by another condition that ensures that the one period utility
functions are strategically equivalent and can be chosen identical. The following
condition, trade-off consistency, serves this end.
Definition 6: The preference relation  on X satisfies trade-off consistency if for all
s,t∈S:
if (asx  bsy) and (csx  dsy) and (atv  btw) then (ctv  dtw), with all
outcomes elements of X.
Trade-off consistency can be expained in terms of strength of preference.
Suppose that a is strictly preferred to b, and that c is strictly preferred to d. The
preference (asx  bsy) then tells us that getting the strictly preferred outcome a instead
of b in period s is not sufficient to outweigh getting x instead of y in all periods other than
s. The preference (csx  dsy), however, tells us that getting the strictly preferred
outcome c instead of d in period s is sufficient to outweigh getting x instead of y in the
other periods. These two preferences, therefore, indicate that in period s the strength of
preference of c over d must be at least as great as the strength of preference of a over b.
Now, trade-off consistency asserts that if the strength of preference of c over d is at least
as great as the strength of preference of a over b in period s, then there does not exist
another period in which the strength of preference of c over d is smaller than the strength
of preference of a over b. That is, if we observe in another period t that getting a instead
of b is sufficient to outweigh getting v instead of w in all periods other than t then getting
c instead of d should also be sufficient.
Trade-off consistency thus ensures that utility differences are ordered similarly in
different periods. This implies that the different one-period utility functions are
cardinally equivalent and thus that they can be chosen identical. However, trade-off
consistency does not imply that each period gets the same weight. In combination with
marginality and generalized utility independence in the expected utility model
respectively the rank-dependent utility model, trade-off consistency implies that the
utility function can be written as λ t t t
t
T
U c h( , )
=1
. Imposing standard gamble variance and
the zero condition as well gives the general multiplicative discounting model U=
λt t t
t
T
v c q h( ) ( )
=1
.
3.3.2. The constant rate discounted utility model
The constant rate discounted utility model, U = 
=
−
T
t
tt
t hqcv
1
1 )()(β  can be
obtained by imposing one additional condition, stationarity, on the general multiplicative
discounting model. It is easily verified that in the constant rate discounted utility model,
the ratio between the weights assigned to utility in period t and to utility in period s is
equal to βt−s. Similarly, the ratio between the weights assigned to utility in period t+e and
to utility in period s+e is equal to βt−s. This implies that in the constant rate discounted
utility model only the difference in timing between outcomes (e.g. t−s) affects
preferences, but not the position in time at which the outcomes occur. For example, the
constant rate discounted utility model implies that if a person is indifferent between an
amount of money x now and an amount of money y in 5 years, then he should also be
indifferent between x in 10 years and y in 15 years, because in both preference
comparisons the difference in timing is 5 years. Stationarity captures the idea that
preferences depend only on the difference in timing and not on the exact timing of the
outcomes. The formal definition of stationarity is as follows.
Definition 7: The individual preference relation  on X satisfies stationarity if there
exists
a common outcome q∈Y such that for all xt, yt∈X:
(x1,...,xT−1,q)  (y1,...,yT−1,q) if and only if  
(q, x1,..,xT−1)  (q, y1,..,yT−1).
In words, stationarity says that preferences over outcomes are unaffected if we
move the common outcome from the last to the first period and delay of all other
outcomes with one period. Note that the differences in timing between the xt are
unaffected by this permutation of outcomes in time.
Theorem 3 summarizes the previous two subsections. A formal proof is given in
the appendix.
Theorem 3: If we replace symmetry by trade-off consistency in Theorems 1 and 2
then
the general multiplicative discounting model U = λt t t
t
T
v c q h( ) ( )
=1
 represents life-cycle preferences over consumption and health status.
If stationarity is imposed as well then the constant rate discounted utility
model U = 
=
−
T
t
tt
t hqcv
1
1 )()(β is representing..
3.3.3. An assessment of the conditions
To conclude the axiomatic analysis, let us briefly comment on the empirical
content of the conditions used to characterize the two discounted utility models. No tests
of trade-off consistency exist in the medical context. The main effect of trade-off
consistency is to impose an additive representation. In an additive representation, what
happens in one period is independent of what happens in all other periods. Therefore,
trade-off consistency is most likely to hold in decision contexts where complementarity
between periods does not affect preference.
Studies that have tested stationarity yield negative results (Cairns and van der Pol,
1997; Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1998). These studies find that people do not only pay
attention to differences in timing between outcomes, i.e. to their relative position in
time, but also to the moment at which they occur, i.e., their absolute position in time.
The general pattern that emerges from the literature on intertemporal preferences for
health is that people
are more timing averse, in the sense that their implied rate of time preference is higher,
for delays that occur in the near future than for dealys that occur in the more distant
future. That is, the difference between year s and year t is discounted more than the
difference between year s+e and year t+e. This finding suggests that other discounting
models than the constant rate discounted utility model may be more appropriate. If trade-
off consistency holds then these models can be derived as special cases of the general
discounted utility model.
4. The valuation of longevity and willingness to pay for QALYs
Next we show when consumption will be constant over time. As was shown in
Section 2, constant consumption implies together with the multiplicative model derived
in Section 3 that cost effectiveness is consistent with life-cycle preferences over
consumption and health status, or, which is equivalent, that cost effectiveness analysis is
consistent with cost benefit analysis.
Given that consumption is constant and the multiplicative model holds we can
derive tractible expressions for the valuation of longevity and  the willingness to pay for
QALYs. We extend the models proposed by Rosen (1988) by including health status in
the analysis. We start with the deterministic case where the individual knows his life
duration with certainty. The deterministic case illustrates the essential ideas while keeping
the analysis relatively straightforward. We then turn to the more realistic stochastic case.
4.1. Certainty
4.1.1. The optimization problem
Consider an individual whose preferences can be described by the multiplicative
model with constant rate discounting:
U = v c q h
at t tt
T
( ) ( )
( )
1
1 11 +
−
=
 (5)
where a is the individual s constant rate of time preference. We assume that v is strictly
increasing and concave. The first derivative of v with respect to c is denoted by vc.
The individual’s wealth consists of initial wealth W and a fixed annual labor
income w. The individual allocates his wealth between consumption and medical
expenditures, which we denote by m. Medical expenditures are in each period a function
of the sequence of quality of life levels (q(h1), ,q(hT)) and duration T:
mt=g((q(h1), ,q(hT)), T). We assume that for all t the first derivative of medical
expenditures with respect to q(ht), denoted thg is positive. The first derivative of medical
expenditures with respect to duration, gT, is also positive. The individual faces a pure
capital market at which he can borrow and invest at interest rate r. The individual cannot
die in debt and has no heirs. Under these assumptions, the individual s budget constraint
becomes:
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The Lagrangian expression for this problem is:
L = v c q h at t tt
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and the first order conditions are:
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Under the assumption that the rate of time preference equals the interest rate
(a=r) it follows from (8a) and (8b) that that the individual will choose ct and ht such that
they are  constant throughout [0,T]. Constancy of health status in turn implies constancy
of medical expenditures. This analysis answers the question when an individual with a
multiplicative utility function will select a constant consumption profile: he will do so
when his rate of time preference equals the interest rate. Hence, given the multiplicative
utility model, cost effectiveness analysis is consistent with cost benefit analysis if the
individual s rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate. This observation has
important implications for the discussion whether the discount rate for health benefits
can be different from the interest rate (the discount rate for costs) (Keeler and Cretin,
1983; Olsen, 1993b). Our analysis shows that if the purpose is to achieve equivalence
between cost effectiveness analysis and cost benefit analysis then health benefits should be
discounted at the interest rate, that is, health benefits should be discounted at the same
rate as costs.
4.1.2. The willingness to pay for a QALY gained
Let us now derive the willingness to pay for a QALY gained if cost effectiveness
analysis is consistent with cost benefit analysis. That is, we assume the
multiplicative model and equality of the rate of time preference and the interest rate.
Because equality of the rate of time preference and the interest rate implies that
q(ht) is constant for all t, thg is constant for all t. Denote the constant value of q(ht) by q
and the constant value of 
th
g by gh. Rewriting (8b) gives:
λ=
hg
cv )(
  (9)
which we substitute in (8a) to give:
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where ε = v
c
v
c  is the elasticity of the utility function for consumption. The parameter ε
reflects the possibilities for intertemporal substitution of consumption. The higher ε, the
better are the possibilities for intertemporal substitution. As ε tends to unity, v(c)
becomes more linear in c and the individual is less concerned about the distribution of
consumption over time than in the value of aggregate consumption. In the limiting case
where ε is equal to one, the individual is not interested in the distribution of consumption
over time, but only cares about total consumption.
The term gq indicates how medical expenditures change as a result of a change in
quality of life. Hence, gq can be interpreted as the marginal cost of an additional unit of
quality of life. A (discounted) QALY is gained if quality of life increases with z =
1
1
1 11 ( )+ −= r tt
T  units. The higher the interest rate the greater the gain in quality of life has
to be. Substitution of z in Eq. (10) defines the willingness to pay for a QALY gained. We
observe that the willingness to pay for a QALY gained depends on four factors. It is
increasing in consumption and the interest rate and decreasing in quality of life (ceteris
paribus, individuals in worse health are willing to pay more for improvements in quality of
life), and the possibilities for intertemporal substitution.
In providing a numerical illustration, we will avoid the complications associated
with discounting by focusing on immediate improvements in health. Empirical estimates
of ε are in the range 0.20 to 0.40 (Thaler and Rosen, 1975; Rosen, 1988). We assume
that ε is equal to 0.25. Consider a person whose annual consumption is US$ 20,000 and
whose quality of life initially is equal to 0.8. It follows that this individual will be willing t o
pay about US$ 100,000 per QALY for immediate improvements.
4.1.3. The willingness to pay for longevity
Let us finally derive the willingness to pay for longevity. Substituting Eq.(9) in
Eq.(8c) and rearranging gives:
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The term gT reflects the responsiveness of medical expenditures to changes in
longevity. That is, gT indicates the marginal cost of additional units of life or the
willingness to pay for longevity. Like the willingness to pay for a QALY gained, it
increases in consumption and it decreases in the interest rate (the higher the interest rate
the less valued are future life years) and in ε. The negative sign of the elasticity ε follows
from the fact that ceteris paribus additional longevity does change the individual s total
consumption throughout his life, but it changes the distribution of consumption. Because
the individual s concern about the distribution of consumption decreases with ε,  his
willingness to pay for longevity decreases with ε.
The willingness to pay for longevity also increases in the surplus of the annual
wage rate over the annual medical expenditures. During the additional time that the
individual lives he is able to create more wealth. The higher his wage rate the more wealth
he creates and the greater his possibilities for increasing consumption.
4.2 Risk
4.2.1. The optimization problem
We now turn to the more realistic case where the individual is uncertain about his
life duration. Let ft be the probability of living for t time periods and let Ft be the
cumulative probability of surviving until time period t at most. That is, Ft = f s
s
t
=
−
1
1
. Then
the probability of being alive at the beginning of time period t, denoted St, is equal to 1−Ft.
The period-specific death rate ρt is defined as the probability of dying during time period t
given that one has survived up to time period t. The period-specific death rate is a
conditional probability defined as 
f
S
t
t
. Hence, St and ρt are related as follows:
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We assume that the individual maximizes expected utility. For each t, if he lives
exactly t periods, then his utility is defined by the multiplicative model with constant rate
discounting and T=t. The individual s expected utility is equal to:
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We assume that the individual participates with a cohort of identical individual in
an actuarially fair annuity system [Yaari, 1965; Rosen, 1988]. Each individual hands over
his  wealth to an insurance company in exchange for a contract that ensures them their
optimal consumption and medical expenditure bundles until death. Obviously, individual
choices are restricted by the total wealth available. The budget constraint facing each
individual is based on overall life expectancy. If initial wealth is positive then those
individuals who die early effectively subsidize the insurance pool and the claims of the
individuals who live longer than expected are financed out of these subsidies.  Under
these assumptions the individual s budget constraint becomes:
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where the medical expenditures are in each period a function of the infinite sequences of
the quality of life levels (q(h1), q(h2), ) and the age-specific death rates (ρ1, ρ2, ...): mt =
( )( ),...,(,),...(),( 2121 ρρhqhqg . The first derivative of medical expenditures with respect
to q(ht) and ρt are denoted ght and g tρ respectively.
Maximization of expected utility, Eq.(13), subject to the budget constraint, Eq.
(14), yields the following first order conditions, in which common terms St have been
cancelled.  
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The first order conditions in the decision problem under risk, Eqs. (15a) and (15b)
are identical with the conditions under certainty, Eqs. (8a) and (8b), because the term St
occurs both in Eq(13) and Eq(14) and cancels out. Hence, the problem under risk becomes
similar to that under certainty and it follows immediately that the optimal paths for
consumption and quality of life are constant if the rate of time preference equals the
interest rate. Hence, the conclusion of decision under certainty that cost effectiveness
analysis will only be equivalent to cost benefit analysis if the individual s rate of time
preference is equal to the interest rate is still valid if his life duration is uncertain.
4.2.2. The willingness to pay for a QALY gained
Even though our conclusions about the consistency between cost effectiveness
analysis and cost benefit analysis are unaffected by the introduction of risk, there is a
change in the willingness to pay for a QALY gained. Let the rate of time preference be
equal to the interest rate. Denote the constant value of q(ht) by q and the constant value
of thg by gh.It then follows from Eqs. (15a) and (15b) that gh, the willingness to pay for a
QALY gained is still equal to:
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However, under uncertainty quality of life has to increase with
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to generate an additional QALY, which exceeds the increase in the certainty case by the
factor St. Because future life-years are uncertain, the survival probabilities act as an
additional discount factor of life-years in the future. Alternatively stated, the willingness
to pay for a given increase in quality of life will be lower in the uncertainty case because
the risk of premature death leads to a lower weight for future periods.
4.2.3. The willingness to pay for longevity
Expected life-duration changes if the period-specific death rates change. The
willingness to pay for longevity therefore follows under uncertainty from the willingness
to pay for changes in the age-specific death rates.  We determine the latter expression.
Because expected life-duration is negatively related to changes in the period-specific death
rates, the willingness to pay for (expected) longevity follows from the willingness to pay
for reductions in the period-specific death rates.
Substitution of 
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=λ  and Eq. (16) in Eq.(15c) gives after some rearranging:
w m
s
s
ρ
ε
ε
ρ
=
−
+ −
−
 -
(c1
1
)
(18)
Obviously, Eq.(18) is negative, because individuals will desire compensation for
increases in the age-specific death rates. Eq.(18) shows that the willingness to pay for
reductions in the age-specific death rates are positively related with consumption and
wealth and negatively with medical expenditures, and the possibilities for intertemporal
substitution. Finally, the willingness to pay for reductions in the period-specific death
rates increases with the death rate. The higher the death rate, the higher the individual’s
willingness to pay for reductions in the death rate.
5. Discussion
This paper has shown under what conditions QALY maximisation is consistent
with life cycle preferences over consumption and health. By implication, this answers the
question under what conditions cost effectiveness analysis will give the same results as
cost benefit analysis. We have shown that cost effectiveness is equivalent to cost benefit
analysis if the lifetime utility function over consumption and health status is additive over
time, multiplicative in consumption and health status, and the utility of consumption is
constant over time. We have derived that the utility function has this form under
expected utility if the preference relation satisfies marginality, symmetry, standard
gamble invariance, and the zero condition and if the individual s rate of time preference is
equal to the interest rate. The latter condition has an interesting implication for the
debate about the appropriate rate of discount for health benefits: our analysis shows that
if the aim is to achieve consistency between the results of cost effectiveness analysis and
individual preferences then health benefits must be discounted at the same rate as health
costs.
Expected utility is now widely believed to be descriptively invalid and we therefore
have also provided an axiomatic analysis of the above utility function under the most
influential nonexpected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory. Under rank
dependent utility theory, marginality has to be replaced by generalized utility
independence.
If cost effectiveness analysis is consistent with cost benefit analysis, i.e., the
above utility function is representing, then it becomes possible to derive tractible
expressions for the willingness to pay for a QALY gained and for the willingness to pay
for longevity. This analysis answers a research question posed by Johannesson (1995a),
who argued that it is important to have information on the factors that determine the
willingness to pay for a QALY gained if cost effectiveness is to be a useful tool in societal
decisions about the allocation of health care resources. We show that the willingness t o
pay for a QALY is determined by four factors: wealth, life expectancy, health status and
the possibilities for intertemporal substitution of consumption. The willingness to pay for
a QALY gained increases with wealth and with life-expectancy and decreases with health
status and the possibilities for intertemporal substitution of consumption.
Even though we have focused on QALY based decision making, our central result
is also valid for over outcome measures. For example if healthy-years equivalents (HYEs)
are used the utility function over consumption and health still has to be multiplicative and
the utility of consumption still has to be constant. That is, standard gamble invariance,
the zero condition, and equality between the interest rate and the individual s time
preference all have to hold. A problem with using HYEs in this context is that the HYE
as intended by Mehrez and Gafni (e.g. Gafni and Birch, 1997) is not a utility and that
additional conditions have to be imposed to use HYEs in life cycle problems involving
both consumption and health. In particular, the utility function over years in full health
has to be linear (Johannesson, 1995b).
Our analysis is based on the view that economic evaluation should have a
foundation in welfare economics. There is a different conception of economic evaluation
which places cost effectiveness analysis outside the realm of welfare economics (e.g.
Culyer, 1991; Williams, 1993; Donaldson, 1998). This extra-welfarist or decision-making
approach posits that principles of optimization theory coupled with an exogenously
specified objective function and an exogenously specified resource constraint suffice as a
foundation for cost effectiveness analysis. As was noted by Johannesson (1995a) and
Weinstein and Manning (1997), the decision-making approach provides little guidance if
the object of cost effectiveness analysis is to compare the efficiency of different
programs and may well lead to problems of suboptimization. It is not our intention t o
resolve the controversy about the role of cost effectiveness analysis. We only observe
that there exists a perception of cost effectiveness which requires a foundation of cost
effectiveness analysis in welfare economics. This perception provides the rationale for
this paper.
The aim of our axiomatic analysis is to reveal the conditions under which cost
effectiveness analysis is equivalent to cost benefit analysis. Let us emphasize, that we do
not intend to argue that these conditions have descriptive or normative force. In fact, as
already indicated in Section 3, we believe that several of the conditions are unlikely t o
hold. For example, marginality is a strong condition, and empirical evidence indicates that
marginality does not hold in medical decision making (Maas and Wakker, 1994). Under
rank dependent utility theory, marginality is replaced by generalized utility independence,
which may be more realistic being a strengthening of utility independence. There exists
some empirical support for utility independence in the medical context.  Symmetry also
seems too restrictive given that empirical research (e.g. Cairns, 1994; Chapman, 1996)
indicates that people have time preference, i.e., they give different decision weights t o
different time periods. However, as was shown in Section 3, symmetry can be replaced by
conditions that allow differential weighting of time points. Empirical evidence on the
validity of stationarity in medical decision making is negative, but the more general
discounting model can be a good description (e.g. Cairns and van der Pol, 1997; Bleichrodt
and Johannesson, 1998).
Future research should test the validity of the conditions identified in this paper.
Difficulties in the empirical estimation of willingness to pay for changes in health status
have spurred the use of cost effectiveness analysis as a tool in the allocation of health
care resources. If the viewpoint is accepted that economic evaluation of health care
should have a foundation in welfare economic theory and if the conditions identified in
this paper do not hold, then the way to advance for methodological research in economic
evaluation is to try and solve the empirical problems surrounding cost benefit analysis
instead of resorting to cost effectiveness analysis.
Appendix: Technical assumptions and proofs
Structural assumptions:
The set X is a Cartesian product of the one-period outcome sets Y, which are
assumed identical. The one-period outcome set Y is a Cartesian product of C+ and H. C+ is
a subset of the set of nonegative real numbers, which is a convex subset of a linear space
over IR and hence endowed with the Euclidean topology. We assume that H is a
connected topological space and that X and XT are both endowed with the product
topology.
The set P consists of all simple lotteries: lotteries with finite support. The
preference relation  over P satisfies the von Neumann Morgenstern axioms (Jensen,
1967). Preferences over X are derived by restricting attention to degenerate lotteries.
Preferences over Y are derived by restricting attention to constant outcomes: (c(1), h(1))
 (c(2), h(2)) iff the sequence that yields the pair (c(1), h(1)) in each time period is at least as
preferred as the sequence that yields the pair (c(2), h(2)) in each time period. Preferences
over consumption and over health status are derived from the preference relation over Y
by restricting attention to those pairs (c, h) in which one of the attributes is held
constant. That is, the preference relation over C+ is defined as: for all c(1), c(2)∈C+and for
all h∈H, c(1)  c(2) iff (c(1), h)  (c(2), h). The preference relation over C+ is assumed t o
satisfy monotonicity: for all c1, c2∈C+ such that c1>c2 and for all h∈H, it is true that (c1,h)
f (c2,h). The preference relation over H is defined as: for all h(1), h(2)∈H and for all C∈C+,
h(1)  h(2) iff (c, h(1))  (c, h(2)). We assume preferential independence of H from C+: if
(c, h(1))  (c, h(2)) for one c∈C+ then (c, h(1))  (c, h(2)) for all c∈C+. Loosely speaking,
preferential independence can be interpreted as a monotonicity condition for the
preference relation over H.
We say that consumption is essential if there exist c, c′∈C+ and h∈H such that (c,
h) f  (c′, h). Similarly we say that health status is essential if there exist c∈C+ and h,h′∈H
such (c, h) f (c, h′). Let atx denote the outcome x∈XT with xt replaced by a:
(x1,..,xt−1,a,xt+1,..,xT). A point in time t∈S is essential if there exist atx, btx∈X
T such that
atx 
f  btx. Essentiality of either consumption or health status implies that at least one
point in time must be essential. We assume that both consumption and health status are
essential (otherwise our problem would become trivial) and that at least two points in time
are essential.
Proof of Theorem 1
By Theorem 4 in Fishburn (1965) marginality implies that U(x) = U xt t
i
T
( )
=1
.
The proof that symmetry implies that all utility functions can be chosen identical has
been given in Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1997).
Fix a c1;t∈C
+ and define q(ht) as U(c
1;t,ht). By standard gamble invariance, for all
ct∈C
+, U(ct,ht) is strategically equivalent to q(ht). Hence for all ct∈C
+, U(ct,ht) is a positive
linear transform of q(ht): U(ct,ht) = wt(ct) + v(ct)q(ht) with wt(ct) real and v(ct) positive.
Positivity of v(ct) follows because we used weak preference ( ) in the definition of
standard gamble invariance. If we would have used indifference instead v(ct) would have
been real and preference reversals would have been possible. Denote death by h=0 and
scale q(ht) such that q(0)=0. By the zero condition, for all c
2;t, c
3;t∈C: wt(c
2;t)+v(c
2;t)*0 =
wt(c
3;t)+v(c
3;t)*0. Hence wt(ct) is constant. By the uniqueness properties of the von
Neumann Morgenstern utility function we may subtract a constant to give U(ct,ht) =
v(ct)q(ht). By monotonicity v(ct) is increasing.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Generalized utility independence implies utility independence of all subsets A⊆S by
setting y=z and v=w. Miyamoto and Wakker (1996) have shown for two attributes that
utility independence implies that U(x) is either additive or multiplicative. Their argument
can easily be generalized to more than two attributes. We illustrate the case where U(x) is
multiplicative. The case where U(x) is additive can de derived in a similar fashion. By
utility independence of x1 from x2,..,xT and by utility independence of x2,..,xT from x1 we
have U(x)=f1(x1)f2..T(x2,...,xT), with f1 and f2..T utility functions over Y and Y
T−1
respectively. Applying utility independence on YT−1 gives f2..T(x2,..,xT) =
f (x )f (x x ) Repe ting this procedure gives the multiplic tive utility function
Now, we use generalized utility independence to distinguish between the
multiplicative and the additive utility function.  We give a proof by contradiction that
generalized utility independence implies that the utility function over life-years must be
additive. Suppose the utility function is multiplicative instead and let generalized utility
independence hold. Then we have
w(p)Avt(a) + [1− w(p)]Bvt(b) ≥ w(p)Avt(c) + [1− w(p)]B vt(d) (A1)
if and only if
w(p)Cvt(a) + [1− w(p)]Dvt(b) ≥ w(p)Cvt(c) + [1− w(p)]D vt(d) (A2)
with A = v1(z1)..vt−1(zt−1)vt+1(zt+1)..vT(zT), B = v1(y1)..vt−1(yt−1) vt+1(yt+1)..vT(yT), C =
v1(w1)..vt−1(wt−1)vt+1(wt+1)..vT(wT), and D = v1(v1)..vt−1(vt−1)vt+1(vt+1)..vT(vT).
From (A1) and (A2) we derive that
vt(a) − vt(c) ≥ 
[ ( )]
( )
1− w p B
w p A  {vt(d) − vt(b)} (A3)
if and only if
vt(a) − vt(c) ≥ 
[ ( )]
( )
1− w p D
w p C  {vt(d) − vt(b)} (A4)
which is clearly not always true. We derive a contradiction by assuming the multiplicative
utility function and hence the additive utility function must be true. The rest of the proof
is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Wakker (1989) has shown that the structural assumptions and trade-off
consistency ensure that there exists an additive representation λt t
t
T
U x( )
=1
 over X.
Because both P and P↓ contain all degenerate probability distributions, the preference
relations over P and P↓  are also representing under certainty. Further, there exist
additive representations over P and P↓ by marginality and generalized marginality
respectively. It follows that U(x) = λt t
i
T
U x( )
=1
represents preferences over P and P↓.
Fishburn (1970) has shown that if stationarity is imposed as well then U(x) =
β t t
i
T
U x−
=
1
1
( ) . The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
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